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ABSTRACT
Online Behavioural targeted Advertising (OBA) has risen
in prominence as a method to increase the effectiveness of
online advertising. OBA operates by associating tags or la-
bels to users based on their online activity and then using
these labels to target them. This rise has been accompa-
nied by privacy concerns from researchers, regulators and
the press. In this paper, we present a novel methodology for
measuring and understanding OBA in the online advertising
market. We rely on training artificial online personas rep-
resenting behavioural traits like ‘cooking’, ‘movies’, ‘motor
sports’, etc. and build a measurement system that is auto-
mated, scalable and supports testing of multiple configura-
tions. We observe that OBA is a frequent practice and notice
that categories valued more by advertisers are more intensely
targeted. In addition, we provide evidences showing that
the advertising market targets sensitive topics (e.g, religion
or health) despite the existence of regulation that bans such
practices. We also compare the volume of OBA advertising
for our personas in two different geographical locations (US
and Spain) and see little geographic bias in terms of inten-
sity of OBA targeting. Finally, we check for targeting with
do-not-track (DNT) enabled and discovered that DNT is not
yet enforced in the web.
1. INTRODUCTION
Business models around personal information, that
include monetizing personal information via Internet
advertising and e-commerce [30], are behind most free
Web services. Information about consumers browsing
for products and services is collected, e.g., using track-
ing cookies, for the purpose of developing tailored ad-
vertising and e-marketing offerings (coupons, promo-
tions, recommendations, etc.). While this can be be-
neficial for driving web innovation, companies, and con-
sumers alike, it also raises several concerns around its
privacy implications. There is a fine line between what
consumers value and would like to use, and what they
consider to be overly intrusive. Crossing this line can in-
duce users to employ blocking software for cookies and
advertisements [1, 4, 8, 10], or lead to strict regulatory
interventions. Indeed, this economics around personal
information has all the characteristics of a “Tragedy of
the Commons” (see Hardin [19]) in which consumer pri-
vacy and trust towards the web and its business models
is a shared commons that can be over-harvested to the
point of destruction.
The discussion about privacy red-lines has just started1
and is not expected to conclude any time soon. Still,
certain tactics, have already gained a taboo status from
consumers and regulators, e.g., price discrimination in
e-commerce [30, 31, 18, 32]. Online Behavioural tar-
geted Advertising (OBA, Sec. 2) on sensitive categories
like sexual orientation, health, political beliefs etc. [34],
or tricks to evade privacy protection mechanisms, like
Do-Not-Track signals, are additional tactics that border
the tolerance of most users and regulators. The objec-
tive of this work is to build a reliable methodology for
detecting, quantifying and characterizing OBA in dis-
play advertising on the Web and then use it to check
for controversial practices.
Challenges in detecting Online Behavioural Ad-
vertising: The technologies and the ecosystem for de-
livering targeted advertising is truly mind boggling, in-
volving different types of entities, including Aggrega-
tors, Data Brokers, Ad Exchanges, Ad Networks, etc.,
that might conduct a series of complex online auctions
to select the advertisement that a user gets to see upon
1FTC released in May 2014 a report entitled “Data Bro-
kers – A Call for Transparency and Accountability”, whereas
the same year the US Senate passed the “The Data Broker
Accountability and Transparency Act (DATA Act)”.
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landing on a webpage (see [37] for a tutorial and survey
of relevant technologies). Furthermore, targeting can be
driven by other aspects e.g., location, gender, age group,
that have nothing to do with specific behavioural traits
that users deem as sensitive in terms of privacy, or it
can be due to “re-targetting” [14, 20, 24] from previ-
ously visited sites. Distinguishing between the different
types of advertising is a major challenge towards deve-
loping a robust detection technique for OBA. On a yet
deeper level, behaviours, interests/types, and relevant
metrics have no obvious or unique definition that can be
used for practical detection. It is non-trivial to unearth
the relative importance of different interests or char-
acteristics that can be used for targeting purposes or
even define them. Last, even if definitional issues were
resolved, how would one obtain the necessary datasets
and automate the process of detecting OBA at scale?
Our contribution: The main contribution of our work
is the development of an extensive methodology for de-
tecting and characterizing OBA at scale, which allows
us to answer essential questions: (i) How frequently is
OBA used in online advertising?; (ii) Does OBA tar-
get users differently based on their profiles?; (iii) Is
OBA applied to sensitive topics?; (iv) Is OBA more
pronounced in certain geographic regions compared to
others?; (v) Do privacy configurations, such as Do-Not-
Track, have any impact on OBA?.
Our methodology addresses all above challenges by 1)
employing various filters to distinguish interest-based
targeting from other forms of advertising, 2) examin-
ing several alternative metrics to quantify the extent
of OBA advertising, 3) relying on multiple independent
sources to draw keywords and tags for the purpose of
defining different interest types and searching for OBA
around them, 4) allowing different geographical and pri-
vacy configurations. Our work combines all the above
to present a much more complete methodology for OBA
detection compared to very limited work existing in the
area that has focused on particular special cases over the
spectrum of alternatives that we consider (see Sec. 6 for
related work).
A second contribution of our work is the implementa-
tion and experimental application of our methodology.
We have conducted extensive experiments for 72 interest-
based personas (e.g., ‘motorcycles’, ‘cooking’, ‘movies’,
‘poetry’ or ‘dating’) including typical privacy-sensitive
profiles (e.g., ‘AIDS & HIV’, ‘left-wing politics’ or ‘hin-
duism’), involving 3 tagging sources and 3 different fil-
ters. For each experiment we run 310 requests (on aver-
age) to 5 different context free “test” websites to gather
more than 3.5M ads. Having conducted more than 2.9K
experiments combining alternative interest definitions,
geographical locations, privacy configurations, metrics,
filters and sources of keywords to characterize OBA, we
observe the following:
(1) OBA is a common practice, 88% of the analyzed
personas get targeted ads associated to all the keywords
that define their behavioural trait. Moreover, half of
the analyzed personas receive between 26-62% of ads
associated to OBA.
(2) The level of OBA attracted by different personas
shows a strong correlation (0.4) with the value of those
personas in the online advertising market (estimated by
the CPC suggested bid for each persona).
(3) We provide strong evidences that show that the on-
line advertising market targets behavioural traits asso-
ciated to sensitive topics related to health, politics or
sexual orientation. Such tracking is illegal in several
countries [7]. Specifically, 10 to 40% of the ads shown
to half of the 21 personas configured with a sensitive
behavioural trait correspond to OBA ads.
(4) We repeat our experiments in both US and Spain
and do not observe any significant geographical bias in
the utilization of OBA. Indeed, the median difference
in the fraction of observed OBA ads by the considered
personas in US and Spain is 2.5%.
(5) We repeat our experiments by having first set the
Do-Not-Track (DNT) flag on our browser and do not ob-
serve any remarkable difference in the amount of OBA
received with and without DNT enabled. This lead us
to conclude that support for DNT has not yet been im-
plemented by most ad networks and sites.
Our intention with this work is to pave the way for
developing a robust and scalable methodology and sup-
porting toolsets for detecting interest-based targeting.
By doing so we hope to improve the transparency around
this important issue and protect the advertising ecosys-
tem from the aforementioned Tragedy of the Commons.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Sec. 2
we describe what Online Behavioural Advertising is.
Sec. 3 describes the proposed methodology to unveil
and measure the representativeness of OBA. Using this
methodology we have implemented a real system that
is described and evaluated in Sec. 4. Sec. 5 presents the
results of the conducted experiments. Finally, Sec. 6
analyzes the related work and Sec. 7 concludes the pa-
per.
2. ONLINE BEHAVIOURAL ADVERTISING
Online Behavioural targeted Advertising (OBA) is
the practice in online advertising wherein information
about the interests of web users is incorporated in tai-
loring ads. This information is usually collected over
time by aggregators or ad-networks while users browse
the web. This information can include the publishers/
webpages a user browses as well as information on activ-
ity on each page (time spent, clicks, interactions, etc.).
Based on the overall activity of the users, profiles can be
built and these profiles can be used to increase the ef-
fectiveness of ads, leading to higher click-through rates
and in turn, higher revenues for the publisher, the ag-
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Figure 1: High level description of how OBA can hap-
pen: User browses multiple webpages over time, each
page has ads and aggregators present on them. When the
user is on the current page (1), the aggregators present
on that page can either be new or aggregators that were
present on previous pages (2). Hence Aggregator 2 can
leverage on past information to show a tailored ad, while
Aggregator 1 can either show a run-of-network (RoN) ad
or get information from Aggregator 2 (3) to show a tai-
lored ad.
gregator and eventually the advertiser by making a sale.
We note that such targeting is referred to as network
based targeting in the advertising literature.
In Figure 1, we provide a very high-level overview
of how OBA can happen, and information gleaned by
browsing can be used. Assume user Alice has no pri-
vacy protection mechanisms enabled in her browser. As
she is visiting multiple publishers (e.g., websites), her
activity is being tracked by multiple aggregators that
are present on each publisher, using any of the avail-
able methods for tracking users [15, 22]. When Alice
visits a publisher, aggregators (aggregator 2) present
on that publisher could have already tracked her across
the web and based on what information they have about
her, they can target her accordingly. Another scenario
can be when an aggregator (aggregator 1) is present
on the current publisher where Alice is but was not
present on previous publishers. In this case, the aggre-
gator can either show a run-of-network ad (un-tailored)
or obtain information about Alice from other aggrega-
tors and/or data sellers to show tailored ads. Indeed
the full ecosystem consisting of aggregators, data sell-
ers, ad-optimizers, ad-agencies etc. is notoriously com-
plex2 [37], however for the purposes of this work, we
represent all entities handling data other than the user
and the publishers, either collecting or selling data, as
aggregators.
Other types of (less privacy intrusive) targeted ad-
vertising techniques include: (i) Geographical Targeted
2http://www.displayadtech.com/the_
display_advertising_technology_landscape#
/the-display-landscape
Ads are shown to a user based on its geographical loca-
tion; (ii) Demographic Targeted Ads are shown to users
based on their demographic profile (age, sex, etc) that
is estimated by aggregators in different manners, for in-
stance, through the user’s browsing history [11]; (iii)
Re-targeting Ads present to the user recently visited
websites, e.g., a user, that has checked a hotel in web-
site A, receives an ad of that hotel when visiting website
B few hours latter. Finally, a user can be exposed to
Contextual Ads when visiting a website. These ads are
related to the theme of the visited website rather than
the user’s profile and thus we consider them as non-
targeted ads.
3. METHODOLOGY TO MEASURE OBA
In this section we describe our methodology to unveil
the presence (or absence) of OBA advertising as well
as to estimate its frequency and intensity compared to
more traditional forms of online advertising.
3.1 Rationale and Challenges
Our goal is to uncover causal links between users ex-
hibiting a certain behavioural trait and the display ads
shown to them. Notice that we do not claim or at-
tempt to reverse engineer the complex series of online
auctions taking place in real time. We merely try to
detect whether there is any correlation between the ad-
vertisements displayed to a user and his past browsing
behaviour.
We create artificial personas that present a very nar-
row web browsing behaviour that corresponds to a very
specific interest (or theme), e.g., ‘motor sports’ or ‘cook-
ing & recipes’. We train each persona by visiting care-
fully selected websites that match its interest and by
doing so invite data aggregators and trackers to clas-
sify our persona accordingly. We refer to the visited
websites as training webpages. For instance, the trai-
ning set for the ‘motor sports’ persona would be formed
by specific motor sports webpages. Therefore, two first
challenges for our methodology are which personas to
examine and how to select training webpages for them
that lead to a minimal profile contamination [11]. By
contamination, we are referring to the association of
tags and labels not related to the main theme of the
persona.
Once the personas and the training webpages have
been properly selected, we need to retrieve the ads that
these personas obtain upon visiting carefully selected
control webpages that meet the following criteria: (i)
include a sufficient number of display ads, and (ii) have
a neutral or very well defined context that makes it easy
to detect context based advertisements and filter them
out to keep only those that could be due to OBA. We
use weather related webpages for this purpose.
The ads shown to a persona in the control pages lead
to websites that we refer to as landing webpages. There-
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fore if the theme of the landing webpages for a per-
sona has a large overlap with the theme of its training
websites we can conclude that this persona frequently
receives OBA ads. To automate and scale the estima-
tion of the topical overlap between training and landing
pages, we rely on online tagging services (e.g., Google
AdWords, Cyren, etc) that categorize webpages based
on keywords. We use them to tag each training and
landing webpage associated to a persona and compute
the existing overlapping. Note that we decided to use
several online tagging services or sources to remove the
dependency on a single advertising platform (a limita-
tion of previous works like in [11, 28]).
As indicated before OBA can co-exist with several
other types of advertisement on the same page, includ-
ing: re-targeting ads, contextual ads, geographically
targeted ads. Our goal is to define a flexible metho-
dology able to detect and measure OBA in the pres-
ence of such ads. Thus, the fourth challenge that our
methodology faces is to define filters for detecting and
removing these other types of ads.
The final challenge for our methodology is to define
meaningful, simple, and easy to understand and mea-
sure metrics to quantify OBA using keywords from the
training and landing pages of a persona.
3.2 Details of the Methodology
- Selection of Personas & Training Pages: The
selection of personas with a very specific behavioural
trait, and thus a reduced profile contamination, is a key
aspect of our methodology. To achieve this in an auto-
mated and systematic manner we leverage the Google
Ad Words’ hierarchical category system, which includes
more than 2000 categories that correspond to specific
personas (i.e., behavioural traits) used by Google and
its partners to offer OBA ads. For each one of these
personas, Ad Words provides a list of related websites
(between 150 and 330 webs). We use these websites as
training pages for the corresponding persona. Specifi-
cally, we consider the 240 personas of level 2 from the
Google Ad Words’ category system and apply the fol-
lowing three-steps filtering process to collect keywords
for each persona while catering to avoid profile contam-
ination:
- Step 1: For a given persona p, we collect the keywords
assigned by Ad Words to every one of its related web-
sites and keep in our dataset only those websites that
have p’s category among their keywords. For instance,
for p = ‘motor sports’, we only keep those related web-
sites categorized by Ad Words with the keyword ‘motor
sports’. After applying this step 202 personas remain
in our dataset.
- Step 2: For each persona p, we visit each website
selected during Step 1, using a clean, in terms of con-
figuration, browser, i.e., without cookies, previous web-
browsing history, or ads preferences profile. Then, we
check the categories from the Google Ad Words sys-
tem added to the ads preference profile3 of our browser
after visiting those websites. We only keep those re-
lated websites, which add to the ads preference profile
exclusively p’s category or p’s category plus a second
related one. For instance, for p = ‘motor sports’, we
only keep a related website in our dataset if it includes
to the ads preferences profile the category ‘motor sport’
or the category ‘motor sports’ plus a second one such
as ‘cars’ or ‘motorbikes’. After applying this step 104
personas remain in our dataset.
- Step 3: Our final dataset consists of 51 personas that
are left with at least 10 training pages each after steps 1
and 2. Note that by having at least 10 training pages we
intend to capture enough diversity in the visited sites
and expose our personas to a number of trackers that
would approximate what a real user would find. Indeed,
the considered personas are exposed to 15-40 trackers
whereas the examination of the browsers of 5 volunteers
revealed that they were exposed to 18-27 trackers4.
In addition to the above systematically collected per-
sonas, we have also selected manually 21 sensitive per-
sonas related to topics that, for instance, privacy regu-
lation in Europe do not allow to track or process (e.g.,
health, ethnicity, sexuality, religion or politics) [7]. In-
terestingly the categories of our sensitive personas do
not appear in the public Google Ad Words’ Hierarchical
Category System, however when querying for them in
Ad Words we obtain a similar output as for any other
persona. We apply the same steps as above with a single
difference in Step 2, where we keep only websites that
do not add any category in the ads preference profile of
our browser. By doing so, we ensure that our sensitive
personas are not being associated with any additional
behavioural trait.
The final list of 51 regular and 21 sensitive personas
can be checked in Figure 3 and Figure 4, respectively.
- Selection of Control Pages: As indicated in the
methodology’s rationale we need a set of pages that
are popular, have ads shown on them and yet have low
number of easily identifiable tags associated with them
and thus do not contaminate the profile of our personas.
We used five popular weather pages5 as control pages
since they fulfil all previous requirements.
3Google’s ads preferences profile represents the
behavioural trait inferred by Google for a browser,
based on the previously visited sites. It includes one or
more categories from the Ad Words category system.
4We have used the tracker detection tool provided by the
EDAA [3] to obtain these results.
5http://www.accuweather.com,http://www.
localconditions.com, http://www.wunderground.com,
http://www.myforecast.com, http://www.weatherbase.
com
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- Visiting Training and Control Pages to obtain
ads: Once we have selected the set of training and con-
trol pages for a persona, we visit them with the follow-
ing strategy (see Sec. 4.1 for details). We start with a
fresh install, and select randomly a page from the pool
of training+control pages to visit with the interval be-
tween different page visits drawn from an exponential
distribution with mean 3 mins6. By doing so, on the
one hand, we regularly visit the training pages so that
we allow trackers and aggregators present in those pages
to classify our persona with a very specific interest ac-
cording to our deliberately narrow browsing behaviour.
On the other hand, the regular visits to control pages
allow us to collect the ads shown to our persona to
latter study whether they are driven by OBA. An al-
ternative strategy would be to visit first the training
pages several times to get our persona profiled by ag-
gregators and visit only control pages. We avoided this
strategy because visiting consecutively multiple weather
sites fooled the data aggregators into believing that our
browser was a “weather” persona.
- Tagging Training and Landing Pages: In order
to be able to detect systematically correlations between
training and landing pages we need to first identify
the keywords that best describe each webpage in our
dataset. For this purpose, we use 3 different sources:
Cyren[2], Google Ad Words[5] and McAfee[9]. Each
source has its own labeling system: Google Ad Words
labels web-pages using a hierarchical category system
with up to 10 levels and tag categories with 1 to 8
keywords. Cyren and McAfee provide a flat tagging
system consisting of 60-100 categories and label web-
pages with at most 3 keywords. Note that by utilis-
ing multiple sources we try to increase the robustness
of our methodology and limit as much as possible its
dependency to the idiosyncrasies of particular labeling
systems. Finally, it is worth noting that the coverage
of the considered tagging services is very high for our
set of training and landing pages. In particular Google,
McAfee and Cyren were able to tag 100%, 99.0% and
95.5% of the training pages and 100%, 97.2% and 93.3%
of the landing pages, respectively.
- Training Set Keywords: To achieve the aforemen-
tioned robustness against the particularities of indivi-
dual classification systems, we filter the keywords as-
signed to a page by keeping only those that are assigned
to the page by more than one of our 3 sources. The idea
is to quantify OBA based on keywords that several of
our sources agree upon for a specific page relevant to
the trained persona. Assume we have a training web-
page W tagged with the set of keywords K1 to K3 for
each one of the 3 sources above. Our goal is to select
6This distribution is selected to emulate a human-being
generated inter-arrival time between visits according to re-
cent measurement studies [23].
a keyword k within Ki (i ∈ [1, 3]) only if it accurately
defines W for our purpose. To do this, we leverage the
Leacock-Chodorow similarity [25] (S(k, l)) to capture
how similar two word senses (keywords) k ∈ Ki and
l ∈ Kj (j ∈ [1, 3] & j 6= i) are. Note that two keywords
are considered similar if their Leacock-Chodorow simi-
larity is higher than a given configurable threshold, T ,
that ranges between 0 (any two keywords would be con-
sidered similar) and 3.62 (only two identical keywords
-exact match- would be considered similar). We com-
pute the similarity of k belonging to a given source with
all the training keywords belonging to other sources and
consider k an accurate keyword only if it presents a
S(k, l) > T with keywords of at least N other sources.
Note that N is also a configurable parameter that allows
us to define a more or less strict condition to consider
a given training keyword in a given source.
- Filtering different types of ads: To complete our
methodology we describe next the filters used in order
to identify and progressively remove landing pages as-
sociated with non-OBA ads:
- Retargeting Ads Filter (Fr): In our experiment a re-
targeting ad in a control page should point to either a
training or a control page previously visited by the per-
sona. Since, we keep record of the previous webpages
visited by a persona, identifying and removing retarget-
ing ads from our landing set is trivial.
- Static and Contextual Ads Filter (Fs&c): We have cre-
ated a profile that after visiting each webpage removes
all cookies and potential tracking information such that
each visit to a website emulates the visit of a user with
empty past browsing history. We refer to this persona
as clean profile. By definition, when visiting a control
webpage the clean profile cannot receive any type of
targeted behavioural ad and thus all ads shown to this
profile correspond to either static ads (ads pushed by an
advertiser into the website) or contextual ads (ads re-
lated to the theme of the webpage). Hence, to eliminate
a majority of the landing pages derived from static and
contextual ads for a persona, we remove all the com-
mon landing pages between this persona and the clean
profile.
- Demographic and Geographical Targeted Ads Filter
(Fd&g): We launch the experiments for all our personas
from the same /24 IP prefix and therefore it is likely
that several of them receive the same ad when geogra-
phical targeting is used. Moreover, we have computed
the Leacock-Chodorow similarity between the categories
of each pair of personas in our dataset to determine
how close their interests are. To filter demographic and
geographical ads we proceed as follows: for a persona
p that has received an ad A, we select the set of other
personas receiving this same ad (O(A) = [p1,A, p2,A, ...])
and compute the Leacock-Chodorow similarity between
p and pi,A ∈ O(A). If the similarity between p and at
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least one of these personas is lower than a given thres-
hold T ′, we consider that the ad has been shown to
personas with a significantly different behavioural trait
and thus it cannot be the result of OBA. Instead, it
is likely due to geographical or demographic targeting
practices.
- Measuring the presence and representativeness
of OBA: We measure the volume of OBA for a given
persona p by computing the overlapping between the
keywords of the training and landing pages for p. Note
that we consider that a training keyword and a landing
keyword overlap if they are an exact match. In parti-
cular, we use two complementary metrics that measure
different aspects of the overlapping between the key-
words of training and landing pages. However, let us
first introduce some definitions used in our metrics: (i)
We define the set of unique keywords associated with
the training pages for a persona p on source s as KTps ;
(ii) We define the set of unique keywords associated
with the landing pages of ads shown to a persona p on
source s on control pages as KLps ; (iii) Finally we de-
fine the set of unique keywords associated to a single
webpage W on source s as KWs . Note that the set
of keywords associated to a web-page remains constant
for a given source regardless the persona. Using these
definitions we define our metrics as follows:
Targeted Training Keywords (TTK): This metric com-
putes the fraction of keywords from the training pages
that have been targeted and thus appear in the set of
landing pages for a persona p and a source s. It is for-
mally expressed as follows:
TTK(p, s) =
|KTps ∧KLps |
|KTps |
∈ [0, 1] (1)
In essence, TTK measures whether p is exposed to
OBA or not. In particular, a high value of TTK indi-
cates that most of the keywords defining the behaviou-
ral trait of p (i.e., training keywords) have been targeted
during the experiment.
Behavioural Advertising in Landing Pages (BAiLP): This
metric captures the fraction of ads whose landing pages
are tagged with at least one keyword from the set of
training pages for a persona p and a source s. In other
words, it represents the fraction of received ads by p
that are likely associated to OBA. BAiLP is formally
expressed as follows:
BAiLP (p, s) =
∑Lps
i=1 f(KW is ) · ntimes
Lps
∈ [0, 1]
where f(KW is ) =
{
1 if (KTps ∧KW is ) ≥ 1
0 if (KTps ∧KW is ) = 0
(2)
Note that ntimes represents the number of times an
ad has been shown to p and Lps is defined as the set of
landing pages for a persona p and source s.
In summary, TTK measures if OBA is happening
and how intensely (what percentage of the training key-
words are targeted) whereas BAiLP captures what per-
centage of the overall advertising a persona receives is
due to OBA (under different filters).
4. AUTOMATED SYSTEM TO MEASURE
OBA
In this section we describe the development and eval-
uation of a system that we developed for implement-
ing our previously described methodology for measuring
OBA.
4.1 System implementation and setup
A primary design objective of our measurement sys-
tem was to be fully automated, without a need for man-
in-the-loop, in any of its steps. The reason for this
is that we wanted to be able to check arbitrary num-
bers of personas and websites, instead of just a hand-
ful. Towards this end, we used a lightweight, headless
browser PhantomJS ver. 1.9 (http://phantomjs.org/)
as our base as we can automate collection and handling
of content as well as configure different user-agents. We
wrote a wrapper around PhantomJS that we call Phan-
tomCurl that handles the logic related to collection and
pre-processing of data. Our control server was setup in
Madrid, Spain. The experiments were run from Spain
and United States. In the case of US we used a transpa-
rent proxy with sufficient bandwidth capacity to for-
ward all our requests. We used a user-agent7 corre-
sponding to Chrome ver. 26, Windows 7. Our default
setup has no privacy protections enabled for personas,
but for the clean profile, we enable privacy protection
and delete cookies after visiting each web-site. A sec-
ond configuration set-up enables the Do Not Track8 [6]
for all our personas. For each persona configuration
(no-DNT and DNT) and location (ES and US) we run,
in parallel, our system 4 times in slots of 8-hours in a
window of 3 days so that all personas are exposed to
the same status of the advertising market. These time
slots generate 310 visits per persona (on average) to the
control pages that based on the the results in [11] suf-
fices to obtain the majority of distinct ads received by
a persona in the considered period of time. To process
the data associated to each persona, configuration and
geographical location we use 3 sources to tag the trai-
7We have repeated some experiments using different
user-agents without noticing major differences in the ob-
tained results.
8Do Not Track is a technology and policy proposal that
enables users to opt out of tracking by websites they do not
visit (e.g., analytics services, ad networks, etc).
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ning and landing pages (Google, McAfee and Cyren), 3
different combinations of filters (Fr; Fr and Fs&c; Fr,
Fs&c and Fd&g) and 2 metrics (TTK and BAiLP). Fur-
thermore, we use different values of T and N (for the
selection of training keywords) and T’ (for filtering out
demographic and geographic targeted ads). Overall our
analysis covers more than 2.9K points in the spectrum
of interest definitions, metrics, sources, filters, geogra-
phical locations, privacy configurations, etc.
Before discussing the obtained results (Sec. 5), in the
next subsection we evaluate the performance of our sys-
tem to identify OBA ads using standard metrics such as
accuracy, false positive ratio, false negative ratio, etc.
It is worth mentioning that, to the best of our know-
ledge, previous measurement works in the detection of
OBA [11, 28] do not perform a similar evaluation of
their proposed methodologies.
4.2 System Performance to identify OBA ads
To validate our system we need to generate a ground
truth dataset to compare against. We used humans for
a subjective validation of correlation between training
and landing pages as done also by previous works [12,
26, 27, 38]. To that end, two independent panelists
subjectively classified each one of the landing pages as-
sociated to few9 randomly selected personas as OBA or
non-OBA. Note that the classification of these two pan-
elists was different in 6-12% of the cases for the different
personas. For these few cases a third person performed
the subjective classification to break the tie.
For each ad, we compare the classification done by
our tool as OBA vs. non-OBA with the ground truth
and compute widely adopted metrics used to evaluate
the performance of detection systems: Recall (or Hit
Ratio), Accuracy, False Positive Rate (FPR) and False
Negative Rate (FNR). Table 1 shows the max and min
value of these metrics across the analyzed personas for
our three sources (McAfee, Google and Cyren). We ob-
serve that, in general, our system is able to reliably iden-
tify OBA ads for all sources. Indeed, it shows Accuracy
and Recall values over 94% as well as a FNR smaller
than 4.5%. Finally, the FPR stay lower than 10% for
all the analyzed personas excepting for the ‘Yard & Pa-
tio’ persona where the FPR increases up to 25%.
5. MEASURING OBA
In this section we present the results obtained with
our measurement system for the purpose of answering
the following essential questions regarding OBA (i) How
frequently is OBA used in online advertising?; (ii) Does
OBA target users differently based on their profiles?;
9Note that the manual classification process required our
panelists to carefully evaluate around 300-400 landing pages
per persona. Then, it was infeasible to perform it for every
persona.
Recall Accuracy FPR FNR
McAfee 99.1/95.6% 99.0/94.2% 25.5/3.8% 4.4/0.1%
Google 99.1/95.7% 99.0/94.3% 25.7/3.8% 4.3/0.1%
Cyren 98.7/95.5% 98.6/94.1% 25.4/4,27% 4.5/1,3%
Table 1: Max and Min values of Recall, Accuracy,
FPR and FNR of our automated methodology to iden-
tify OBA ads for our three sources (McAfee, Google and
Cyren) for the analyzed personas. Max and Min values
correspond to ‘Bycicles Accesories’ and ‘Yard & Patio’
personas, respectively.
Training Pages
http://poolpricer.com http://levelgroundpool.com
http://whirlpool-zu-hause.de http://poolforum.se
http://eauplaisir.com http://photopiscine.net
http://a-pool.czm http://allas.fi
http://seaglasspools.com http://piscineinfoservice.com
Table 2: Sample of the training webpages for ‘Swim-
ming Pools & Spas’ persona
(iii) Is OBA applied to sensitive topics?; (iv) Is OBA
more pronounced in certain geographic regions com-
pared with others?; (v) Does Do-Not-Track have any
impact on OBA?
We will start by analysing a concrete example and
try to help the reader follow along the different steps
of our methodology. After that we will present holistic
results from a large set of experiemtns.
5.1 Specific case: Swimming Pools & Spas and
Google
Let us consider a persona, ‘Swimming Pools & Spas’,
and a source, ‘Google’, to present the results obtained in
each step of our methodology for this specific case. Ta-
ble 2 shows the set of training webpages for the ‘Swim-
ming Pools & Spas’ persona. One can observe by the
name of the webpages their direct relation to the ‘Swim-
ming Pools & Spas’ persona.
We train this persona as described in Section 3.2.
Then, in the post-processing phase we tag the training
and landing webpages using our 3 sources. To describe
the process in this subsection we refer to the results ob-
tained for ‘Google’. Table 3 shows the 6 keywords that
Google assigns to the training websites in the first col-
umn. However, this initial set of keywords may present
some contamination including keywords unrelated to
the ‘Swimming Pools & Spas’ persona. Hence, we com-
pute the semantic similarity between these keywords
and the keywords assigned by other sources to the trai-
ning webpages with N = 2 and T = 2.5. This technique
eliminates 2 keywords and leaves a final set of 4 training
keywords shown in the second column of Table 3.
Let us now focus on the landing webpages. Our ex-
periments provide a total of 381 unique landing web-
pages after filter Fr. Then, we pass each of these web-
pages for Fs&c and Fd&g filters sequentially. Each fil-
ter eliminates 226 and 128 of the initial landing pages,
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Figure 2: TTK and BAiLP for 10 personas and all sources for N = 2, T = T’ = 2.5 and all filters activated (Fr, Fs&c,
Fd&g)
Training Keywords Filtered Training
Keywords
Gems & Jewellery —
Gyms & Health Clubs —
Outdoor Toys & Play Equipment Outdoor Toys & Play Equipment
Security Products & Services Security Products & Services
Surf & Swim Surf & Swim
Swimming Pools & Spas Swimming Pools & Spas
Table 3: Keywords associated to the training websites
for ‘Swimming Pools & Spas’ using Google as source be-
fore and after applying the semantic overlapping filtering
with N = 2 and T = 2.5
TTK BAiLP
Fr 1 0.17
Fs&c 1 0.75
Fd&g 1 0.97
Table 4: TTK and BAiLP values after applying each
filter for the ‘Swimming Pools & Spas’ persona and
‘Google’ source.
respectively. This indicates that contextual ads (elimi-
nated by Fs&c) are the more frequent type of ads. After
applying each filter we compute the value of the two de-
fined metrics (TTK and BAiLP) using the resultant set
of landing pages and its associated keywords and show
them in Table 4. The results suggest a high presence
of OBA ads. Indeed, the obtained TTK values indicate
that 100% of the training keywords are targeted and
thus they appear among the landing keywords. More-
over, the BAiLP shows that, depending on the specific
applied filter, between 17 and 97% of received ads by
our ‘Swimming Pools & Spas’ persona are associated to
landing pages tagged with keyword from the training set
and thus are likely to be associated to OBA advertising.
Note that in the extreme case where no filters are ap-
plied, BAiLP represents the percentage of all ads shown
Landing Webpages Num. ads
www.abrisud.co.uk 1195
www.endlesspools.com 106
www.samsclub.com 16
www.paradisepoolsms.com 8
www.habitissimo.es 8
www.abrisud.es 6
ww.atrium-kobylisy.cz 6
www.piscines-caron.com 5
athomerecreation.net 4
www.saunahouse.cz 4
Table 5: Top 10 list of landing webpages and the num-
ber of times their associated ads were shown to our
‘Swimming Pools & Spas’ persona.
that are suspected to be targeted (17% for ‘Swimming
Pools & Spas’ persona). In the other extreme, when
all filters are applied, BAiLP shows the same percent-
age after having removed all advertisements that can be
attributed to one of the known categories described in
Sec. 2 (97% for ‘Swimming Pools & Spas’ persona).
Finally, Table 5 shows the Top 10 landing pages as-
sociated to a larger number of ads shown during our
experiment. We observe that the three most frequent
landing pages, that amount to most of the ads shown to
our persona, are related to Swimming Pools, pointing
clearly to OBA.
5.2 How frequent is OBA?
Let us start analyzing the results obtained with our
methodology for each independent source. For this pur-
pose, Figure 2 presents the values of TTK and BAiLP
for 10 selected personas in a radar chart. In particular,
these results correspond to experiments run from Spain,
with DNT disabled and all filters (Fr, Fs&c, Fd&g) ac-
tivated. First, TTK shows its maximum value (i.e.,
1) in 9 of the studied personas for Google and Cyren
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Figure 3: Average and standard deviation of TTK and BAiLP for each regular persona in our dataset sorted from
higher to lower average BAiLP.
and in 8 personas for McAfee. Moreover, TTK is not
lower than 0.5 in any case. This result indicates that
regardless of the source used to tag websites, typically
all the training keywords of a persona are targeted and
then appear in its set of landing keywords. Second, we
observe a much higher heterogeneity for BAiLP across
the different sources. In particular, Cyren seems to
consistently offer a high value of BAiLP in comparison
with the other sources whereas McAfee offers the high-
est (lowest) BAiLP for 5 (3) of the considered personas
and shows a remarkable agreement (BAiLP difference
< 0.05) with Cyren in half of the considered personas.
Google is the most restrictive source offering the low-
est BAiLP for 6 personas. In addition it only shows
close agreement with Cyren and McAfee for two per-
sonas (‘Air Travel’ and ‘Banking’). These results are
due to the higher granularity offered by Google com-
pared to Cyren and McAfee that makes more difficult
finding matches between training a landing keywords
for that source. If we now compare the BAiLP across
the selected personas, we observe that for 27 of the 30
considered cases BAiLP ranges between 0.10 and 0.94
regardless of the source. This indicates that 10-94%
of the received ads by these personas are associated to
landing pages tagged with training keywords and then,
they are likely to be the result of OBA.
These preliminary results suggest an important pres-
ence of OBA in online advertising. In order to con-
firm this observation and understand how representa-
tive OBA is, we have computed the values of our two
metrics, TTK and BAiLP, for every combination of per-
sona, source, set of active filters and setting N = 2, T
= T’ = 2.5 in our dataset. Again these experiments
are run from Spain and with DNT disabled. In total 4
runs of 459 independent experiments were conducted.
Figure 3 shows the average and standard deviation val-
ues of TTK and BAiLP for the 51 considered personas,
sorted from higher to lower average BAiLP value. Our
results confirm a high presence of OBA ads. The ob-
tained average TTK values indicate that for 88% of
our personas all training keywords are targeted and ap-
pear among the landing keywords (for the other 12% at
least 66% of training keywords match their correspon-
dent landing keywords). This high overlapping shows
unequivocally the existence of OBA. However to more
accurately quantify its representativeness we rely on our
BAiLP metric, which demonstrates that half of our per-
sonas are exposed (on average) to 26-63% of ads linked
to landing pages tagged with keywords from the persona
training set. Since the overlap is consistently high, in-
dependently of the source, filters used, etc., we conclude
that these ads are likely the result of OBA.
5.3 Are some personas more targeted than oth-
ers?
Figure 3 shows a clear variability in the representa-
tiveness of OBA for different personas. Indeed, the
distribution of the average BAiLP values across our
personas presents a median value equal to 0.23 with
an interquartile range of 0.25 and a max/min value of
0.63/0.02. This observation invites the following ques-
tion: “Why are some personas targeted more intensely
than others?”. Our hypothesis is that the level of OBA
received by a persona depends on its economic value for
the online advertising market. To validate this hypoth-
esis we leverage the AdWords keyword planner tool10,
which enables us to obtain the suggested Cost per Click
10https://adwords.google.com/KeywordPlanner
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Figure 4: Average and standard deviation of TTK and BAiLP for each sensitive persona in our dataset sorted from
higher to lower average BAiLP.
(CPC) bids for each of our personas.11 The bid value is
a good indication of the relative economic value of each
persona. Then, we compute the spearman and pear-
son correlation between the BAiLP and the suggested
CPC for each persona in our dataset. Note that to
properly compute the correlation, we eliminate outlier
samples based on the suggested CPC.12 The obtained
spearman and pearson correlations are 0.44 and 0.40
(with p-values of 0.004 and 0.007), respectively. These
results validate our hypothesis since we can observe a
marked correlation between the level of received OBA
(BAiLP) and the value of the persona for the online
advertising market (suggested CPC bid).
5.4 Is OBA applied to sensitive topics?
The sensitive personas in our dataset present behaviou-
ral traits associated to sensitive topics including health,
religion, and politics. Tracking these topics is illegal
(at least) in Europe. To check if this is being respected
by the online advertising market, we repeat the exper-
iment described in the previous subsection for all our
21 sensitive personas, setting the geographical location
in Spain. In this case, we run 4 repetitions of 189 inde-
pendent experiments.
Figure 4 shows the average and standard deviation
values of TTK and BAiLP for each sensitive persona,
sorted again from higher to lower average BAiLP value.
One would expect to find values of TTK and BAiLP
11Specifically, we use the keyword defining the interest of
each persona to obtain its suggested CPC bid.
12We use a standard outlier detection mechanism, which
considers a sample as an outlier if it is higher (smaller) than
Q3+1.5*IQR (Q1-1.5*IQR) being Q1, Q3 and IQR the first
quartile, the third quartile and the interquartile range, re-
spectively.
close to zero indicating that sensitive personas are not
subjected to OBA. Instead, our results reveal that de-
spite the lower values compared to the personas of Figure
3, the median value of average TKK is 0.47 indicat-
ing that for half of the sensitive personas at least 47%
of the keywords defining their behavioural trait remain
targeted. Moreover, BAiLP results show that 10-40%
of the ads received by half of our sensitive personas
are associated to OBA. In summary, we have provided
solid evidence that sensitive topics are tracked and used
for online behavioural targeting despite the existence of
regulation against such practices.
5.5 Geographical bias of OBA
In order to search for possible geographical bias of
OBA, we have run the 459 independent experiments
described in Subsection 5.2 using a transparent proxy
configured in US so that visited websites see our mea-
surement traffic coming from a US IP address. For each
persona, we have computed the average BAiLP across
all combinations of sources and filters for the experi-
ments run in Spain vs. US and calculated the BAiLP
difference. Figure 5 shows the distribution of average
BAiLP difference for the 51 considered personas in the
form of a boxplot. Note that a positive (negative) dif-
ference indicates a major presence of OBA ads in Spain
(US). The BAiLP differences are restricted to less than
10 percentage points across all cases with an insignif-
icant bias (median of BAiLP difference = 2.5%) to-
wards a major presence of OBA ads in Spain than in
US. Hence, we conclude that there is not a remarkable
geographical bias in the application of OBA. Note that
we have repeated the experiment with our other metric,
TTK, obtaining similar conclusions.
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Figure 5: Distribution of the average BAiLP difference
for the 51 regular personas in our dataset for the cases:
Spain vs. US (left) and DNT vs. non-DNT (right)
5.6 Impact of Do-Not-Track in OBA
Following the same procedure as in the previous sub-
section, we have computed the average BAiLP differ-
ence when DNT is activated from when DNT is not
for each one of the 51 regular personas in our dataset,
fixing in both cases the geographical location to Spain.
Figure 5 depicts the distribution of the average BAiLP
difference where, a positive (negative) difference indi-
cates a major presence of OBA ads with the DNT acti-
vated (deactivated). The median of the distribution is
∼0, indicating that half of the personas attract more
OBA ads either with DNT activated or not. More-
over, the IQR reveals that half of the personas present
a relatively small BAiLP difference (≤ 8 percentage
points). Therefore, the results provide strong evidences
that DNT is barely enforced in Internet and thus its im-
pact in OBA is negligible. Again, we have repeated this
experiment with TTK obtaining similar conclusions.
6. RELATED WORK
Our work is related to recent literature in the areas of
measurement driven studies on targeting/personalization
in online services such as search [17, 29] and e-commerce
[30, 31, 18]. More specifically, in the context of ad-
vertising the seminal work by Guha et al. [16] presents
the challenges of measuring targeted advertising, in-
cluding high levels of noise due to ad-churn, network ef-
fects like load-balancing, and timing effects. Our metho-
dology considers these challenges. Another early work
by Korolova et al. [21] presents results using microtar-
geting to expose privacy leakage on Facebook.
Other recent studies have focused on economics of
display advertising [15], characterizing mobile advertising [35]
and helping users to get control of their personal data
and traffic in mobile networks [33], designing large scale
targeting platforms [13] or investigating the effective-
ness of behavioural targeting [36]. Moreover, Le´cuyer
et al. [26] developed a service-agnostic tool to establish
correlation between input data (e.g., users actions) and
resulting personalized output (e.g., ads). The solution
is based on the application of the differential correlation
principle on the input and output of several shadow ac-
counts that generate a differentially distinct set of in-
puts.
Our work is different in focus to this previous liter-
ature since we are primarily concerned with OBA in
display advertising, with the intention of understand-
ing the collection and use of sensitive personal informa-
tion at a large scale. To the best of the authors know-
ledge, only a couple of previous works analyze the pres-
ence of OBA advertising using a measurement driven
methodology. Liu et al. [28] study behavioural adver-
tisement using complex end-user profiles with hundreds
of interests (instead of personas with specific interests)
generated from an AOL dataset including users online
search history. The extracted profiles from passive mea-
surements are rather complex (capturing multiple inte-
rests and types), and are thus, rather inappropriate
for establishing causality between specific end-user inte-
rests and the observed ads. Our approach is active
rather than passive, and thus allows us to derive an ex-
act profile of the interest that we want to capture. Fur-
thermore, the authors collapse all types of targeted ad-
vertising (demographic, geographic and OBA), except-
ing re-targeting, whereas we focus on OBA due to its
higher sensitivity from a privacy perspective. Barford
et al. [11] present a large-scale characterisation study of
the advertisement landscape. As part of this study the
authors look at different aspects such as the new ads
arrival rate, the popularity of advertisers, the impor-
tance of websites or the distribution of the number of
ads and advertisers per website. The authors examine
OBA very briefly. They trained personas but as they
acknowledge their created profiles present a significant
contamination including unrelated interests to the per-
sona. Our methodology carefully addresses this issue.
Moreover, these previous works check only a small point
of the entire spectrum of definitions, metrics, sources,
filters, etc. For instance, they rely on Google ads ser-
vices to build their methodologies which reduces the
generality of their results. Our work has taken a much
broader look on OBA including both the methodology,
the results, and the derived conclusions. Finally, to the
best of the authors knowledge, ours is the first work
reporting results about the performance of the used
methodology, the extent to which OBA is used in dif-
ferent geographical regions and the utilization of DNT
across the web.
7. CONCLUSIONS
This paper presents a methodology to identify and
quantify the presence of OBA in online advertising. We
have implemented the methodology into a scalable sys-
tem and run experiments covering a large part of the en-
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tire spectrum of definitions, metrics, sources, filters, etc
that allows us to derive conclusions whose generality is
guaranteed. In particular, our results reveal that OBA
is a technique commonly used in online advertising.
Moreover, our analysis using more than 50 trained per-
sonas suggests that the volume of OBA ads received
by a user varies depending on the economical value as-
sociated to the behaviour/interests of the user. More
importantly, our experiments reveal that the online ad-
vertising market targets behavioural traits associated to
sensitive topics (health, politics or sexuality) despite the
existing legislation against it, for instance, in Europe.
Finally, our analysis indicates that there is no signifi-
cant geographical bias in the application of OBA and
that do-not-track seems to not be enforced by publishers
and aggregators and thus it does not affect OBA. These
essential findings pave a solid ground to continue the
research in this area and improve our still vague know-
ledge on the intrinsic aspects of the online advertising
ecosystem.
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